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FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law §
62.04[3]. (1992).
2 Rev. Rul. 66-159, 1966-1 C.B. 162.
See I.R.C. § 1034.
3 Ltr. Rul. 8007050, Nov. 23, 1979.
4 Ltr. Rul. 8239055, June 29, 1982
(trustee was adverse party as to 25
percent of trust so 75 percent of
residence eligible); Ltr. Rul. 9118017,
Feb. 1, 1991 (trustors had power
unlimited by any conditions, to remove
trustee and substitute anyone, including
themselves as trustee; trustee had power
to make discretionary distributions
from income and principal and not
limited by reasonably definite
standard).
5 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.611-1(c)(4), 1.167(h)-
1(b).
6 I.R.C. § 179(d)(4).
7 Ltr. Rul. 7747007, Aug. 19, 1977; Ltr.
Rul. 8132027, May 1, 1981.
8 See Ltr. Rul. 8326023, March 23, 1983
(no acceleration on transfer of
corporate stock to grantor trust, when
grantor trust terminated with corpus
distributed to beneficiaries or when
trust terminated by reason of death of
beneficiary with interest passing to
family member).  See also Ltr. Rul.
9116009, Jan. 15, 1991 (transfer of
property from one revocable living
trust to another inter vivos trust (of
heir) were change in form and not
disposition).
9 See I.R.C. § 2032A.
1 0 See I.R.C. § 2032A(g). See 5 Harl,
Agricultural Law § 43.03[2][e] (1992).
1 1 I.R.C. § 2032A(c).
1 2 Ltr. Rul. 7826024, March 28, 1978;
Ltr. Rul. 9009053, Dec. 6, 1989
(grantor considered to be owner of
revocable living trust).
1 3 Ltr. Rul. 7907120, Nov. 17, 1978.
1 4 Rev. Rul. 74-613, 1974-2 C.B. 153.
1 5 See I.R.C. § 691(a).
1 6 I.R.C. § 1244(d)(4).
1 7 E.g., Iowa Code § 496C.10.
1 8 I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2).
1 9 I.d.
2 0 Black v. Comm'r, 765 F.2d 862 (9th
Cir. 1985).
2 1 Est. of May v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1978–20.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION.  The disputed land
was created by rimrock which prevented placing a fence on
the true boundary between the parties' properties.  The
disputed area was unimproved  and not used by the defendant
until 1989 when the defendant rebuilt the fence as part of a
pasture.  The plaintiff sought an injunction and the
defendant asserted ownership of the disputed land by adverse
possession.  The court upheld judgment for the plaintiff
because the defendant failed to show actual, open, visible
and continuous occupancy for more than 20 years.  The
defendant argued that the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence applied because the fence had been recognized
as the boundary for over 20 years.  The court disagreed and
held that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence applied
only as to the element of hostile occupancy and first required
actual and continuous occupancy in order to be applied.
Lien v. Beard, 478 N.W.2d 578 (S.D. 1991).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE. The debtors
owned a farm under a sole proprietorship and in their
Chapter 11 plan proposed to contribute their labor and
exempt property to the farm business to satisfy the absolute
priority rule.  The debtors' attorney also agreed to be paid
out of future farm earnings instead of estate property.  The
debtors claimed that because the farm business had little or
no "going concern" value, the debtors did not retain any
interest of value.  The court rejected this argument, noting
that the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197
(1988), held that the retained control over the business and
possible future earnings from the business were not
sufficient retained interests to invoke the absolute priority
rule.  The court held that there was no new value exception
to the absolute priority rule, but even under such an
exception, the debtors' contribution must be necessary for
the reorganization and must be substantial and exceed the
value of the debtors' retained interests in the business.  The
debtors were held not to have met the burden of showing
their entitlement to the exception.  In re  Drimmel, 1 3 5
B.R. 410 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'g , 108 B.R. 2 8 4
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The debtor was a 50 percent
shareholder in a corporation with one other 50 percent
shareholder.  Because of disagreements between the
shareholders, a provisional director was appointed prior to
the debtor's filing for bankruptcy.  After the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, the other director persuaded the provisional
director to vote in favor of issuing additional stock to the
other director in exchange for corporate debt held by the
director, thus decreasing the debtor's stock share to less than
50 percent.  The debtor sought to avoid the stock transfer as
violating the automatic stay and the other director sought
relief from the automatic stay for a state court action to
remove the provisional director.  The court held that the
actions of the corporation through its board of directors did
not violate the automatic stay in a shareholder's bankruptcy
case but that a state court action in which the debtor was
named as a defendant was stayed by the bankruptcy case.  In
re  Calvert, 135 B.R. 398 (Bankr. S.D. Cal .
1991) .
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtor claimed an
exemption in household goods subject to a nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money security interest.  Under Ohio Code §
2329.66, an exemption in such property was allowed only
where the property was not subject to a third party lien.
The court held that under Owen v. Owen, 111 S.Ct. 1833
(1991), the test for avoidable liens against exempt property
was whether the property was exempt but for the lien.
Therefore, the Ohio limitation on the exemption did not
prevent avoidance of the lien.  In re Sullens, 135 B . R .
288 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
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ESTATE PROPERTY.  The District Court decision
in In re Lybrook, see p. 42 supra, has been published.  In
re  Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991, aff'g,
135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aff'g , 107 B . R .
611 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor purchased two duplexes by
land contract and claimed the land as an exempt homestead.
The court held that a land contract vendee's interest in a
residence was eligible for the homestead exemption.  In re
Mastowski, 135 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. N . Y .
1992) .
Within six months prior to filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor sold a rural homestead and purchased an urban
homestead with about one-third of the proceeds.  The debtor
claimed a homestead exemption under Tex. Prop. Code §
41.001 for the remaining proceeds of the sale of the rural
homestead.  The debtor argued that under Section 41.001(c),
the proceeds of the sale of a homestead remained exempt for
six months.  The court held that the proceeds were not
exempt because the debtor abandoned the homestead claim in
the proceeds to the extent the proceeds were not used to
purchase a new homestead.  In re  Evans, 135 B . R .
261 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
IRA'S.  The debtor claimed an interest in an IRA as
exempt under the federal exemption, 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(10)(E).  The debtor was age 57 and still employed.
The court adopted the holding of In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21
(3d Cir. 1983) that only a present right to receive payments
from an IRA is exempt under Section 522(d)(10)(E) and that
the debtor's future right to receive payments upon reaching
age 61 1/2 was not exempt.  Matter of Chick, 1 3 5
B.R. 201 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
PENSION PLAN.  The debtors, husband and wife, each
had a vested interest in an employee pension plan.  The
husband's plan allowed the husband to direct the investment
of the funds, borrow up to 25 percent of the fund and to seek
distribution of up to 25 percent of the fund for certain
purposes.  The court held that the husband's interest in the
pension fund was not a spendthrift trust and was not exempt
because the fund was not needed for the support of the debtor
or wife.  The wife's pension plan was provided by a
governmental employer and contained an anti-alienation
clause required by federal law.  The court held that although
the wife's pension plan was also not a spendthrift trust, the
wife interest in the plan was exempt under nonbankruptcy
law.  In re  Sawyers, 135 B.R. 371 (Bankr. W . D .
Mo. 1992).
The debtor was a physician and sole shareholder of a
professional corporation which established an ERISA
qualified pension plan.  The court held that the plan was not
excluded from the bankruptcy estate as a spendthrift trust
because the debtor as sole shareholder had control over the
pension fund.  In addition, the court held that ERISA pre-
empted the Arizona exemption for pension plans and the
plan was not exempt under ERISA as nonbankruptcy law
exemption.  In re  Reed, 951 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir .
1991) .
  CHAPTER 12
PLAN .  The debtor's Chapter 12 plan provided for
complete satisfaction of an undersecured creditor's claim by
either transfer of the farm land collateral or reduction of the
claim to the fair market value of the farm land and payment
of the new principal over 40 years at 9 percent interest.  The
first option was selected by the debtor and the creditor
objected to the plan as not meeting Section 1225.  The
court held that under Section 506, the undersecured claim
was to be divided into a secured and unsecured claim.  The
debtor argued that under Section 1225(a)(5)(C), the plan
must be confirmed if a secured claim is satisfied by
surrendering the collateral.  The court held that a plan could
not be confirmed because the plan did not contain provisions
to cover the contingencies of the surrendered property being
worth less or more than the secured claim.  In addition, the
plan could not be confirmed because the plan made no
provision for payment of disposable income for the
unsecured portion of the creditor's claim and the creditor
would not receive the same amount as in a Chapter 7
liquidation.  In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir .
1991) .
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
CLAIMS.  Although the Chapter 7 debtor listed the
IRS as a creditor in the bankruptcy schedules, the claim was
listed at zero and the IRS did not file a claim in the case.
After the debtor received the discharge, the IRS filed a notice
of levy for pre-petition taxes.  The debtor sought to include
the IRS claim in the bankruptcy case as a late filed claim.
The court held that although the untimely filed claim was
not allowable under the bankruptcy rules because the debtor
did not show excusable neglect in failing to timely file the
claim, the late filed claim would be allowed but would be
subordinated to all other unsecured creditors.  In re
Crawford, 135 B.R. 128 (D. Kan. 1991).
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.  An officer of
the corporation debtor made a post-petition transfer of
corporate funds to pay the officer's individual income tax
liability and the bankruptcy trustee sought to recover the
transfer under Section 549(a) from the IRS.  The court held
that Section 106(c) does not waive governmental immunity
from a monetary recovery action; therefore, the action to
recover the post-petition transfer was barred by
governmental immunity. U.S. v. Nordic Vi l lage ,
Inc., 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,109, 1 3 5
B.R. p 16 (yellow) (S. Ct. 1992), rev'g, 9 1 5
F.2d 1049 (6th Cir. 1991).
JURISDICTION.  The debtor and spouse filed joint
income tax returns but the spouse was not included in the
bankruptcy case.  Although the IRS was receiving payment
under the debtor's Chapter 13 plan for taxes owed jointly,
the IRS levied against the spouse's property.  The debtor
argued that the levy violated the automatic stay.  The court
held that it had no jurisidiction over matters between the
IRS and the nondebtor spouse.  In re  Goldsby, 92 -1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,118 (Bankr. E . D .
Ark. 1992).
POST-PETITION SECURITY INTERESTS.
The IRS had filed a notice of tax lien in 1988 and the debtor
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 1989.  After the
bankruptcy filing, the debtor received an inheritance which
became estate property and the IRS filed a claim as secured
based upon the pre-petition tax lien.  The court held that the
automatic stay prevented the pre-petition lien from attaching
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to the post-petition acquired property.  In re  Fuller, 9 2 -
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,119 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1992).
RETURNS .  After the debtors' Chapter 11 plan was
confirmed, the debtors transferred some of the estate property
in trust to a trustee for the purpose of liquidating the
property and distributing the proceeds as required by the
plan.  The court held that the liquidating trustee was required
to file a federal income tax fiduciary return and pay any tax
liability resulting from the sale of the trust property.
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,110, 135 B.R. p. 34 (yellow) ( S .





ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. The plaintiff
was a dairy farmer who enrolled in the Dairy Termination
Program (DTP).  The ASCS ruled that the plaintiff had
violated the DTP contract in that two cows were not
destroyed and were still being milked by a former employee
of the plaintiff on another farm.  Although the plaintiff
pursued the ruling through DASCO and presented
substantial evidence to refute the statements of the former
employee as to how the cows escaped slaughter, the plaintiff
was not allowed to cross-examine the former employee.
The court first held that the DASCO decision was not
reviewable de novo because the instant case was a review of
an administrative decision and not a contract case.  The court
also held that the administrative appellate procedure was
governed by the ASCS appeal regulations, 7 C.F.R. Part
780, and not the Administrative Procedures Act.  However,
the court held that the ASCS abused its discretion under Part
780 in not allowing cross-examination of the former
employee, given the substantial contradictory evidence and
the ASCS strong reliance on the former employee's
statements in finding that the plaintiff had violated the DTP
contract. In addition, in its remand order, the court required
DASCO to make specific findings as to the knowledge of
the plaintiff as to the removal of the cows by the former
employer, because if the plaintiff did not know about the
removal, the plaintiff could not be held in violation of the
contract.  Doty v. U.S., 24 Cls.Ct. 615 (1991).
ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS.  Sod
farmers brought suit to invalidate regulations under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 excluding sod
from the definition of "other perishable commodities"
produced by "seasonal agricultural services."  The exclusion
resulted in ineligibility of illegal alien sod workers for
participation in the amnesty program which would have
allowed the workers to become citizens.  The court held that
the exclusion was reasonable, given the differences in the
growing and harvesting requirements of sod from other types
of agricultural commodities.  Note: After the initial decision
against the regulations, the USDA amended the regulations
to include sod workers and the sod workers were granted
citizen status.  However, as the court noted in this case, the
Attorney General has the power to revoke the grant of
citizenship if the workers are later found to not have been
qualified for the program.  Morales v. Yeutter, 9 5 2
F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1991), rev'g , 772 F. Supp.
1033 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING.  The
CME has announced proposed amendments to the feeder
cattle futures contract which would (1) reduce the geographic
region from which cash prices are collected for purposes of
calculating the cash settlement price, (2) reduce the weight
range of feeder steers for which the cash prices underlying
the cash settlement price are collected, (3) specify the frame
and muscling characteristics of those feeder steers for which
cash prices are eligible for calculating the cash settlement
price, (4) change the cash settlement price's calculation
procedures to provide for a fully weighted average cash
settlement price with the price of each transaction being
weighted by the weight of the feeder steers included in the
transaction, (5) replace Cattle Fax, Inc. with the USDA-
AMS as the organization responsible for collecting the cash
prices underlying the cash settlement price, and (6) increase
the futures contract's trading unit from 40,000 to 50,000
pounds.  57 Fed. Reg. 7570 (Mar. 3, 1992).
The NYCE has applied for designation as a contract
market in futures options on cotton No. 2 straddles.  5 7
Fed. Reg. 6714 (Feb. 27, 1992).
CONVERSION.  The defendant was convicted of
conversion of FmHA collateral for the sale of cattle which
secured an FmHA loan without prior consent of the FmHA.
The defendant argued that the element of intent to defraud
was not supported by the evidence in that the defendant had
the authority to sell the cattle.  The court held that sufficient
evidence was presented in that the defendant testified that all
checks for collateral had to have the defendant's and FmHA's
name on them. U.S. v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1 2 0 6
(10th Cir. 1991).
PAYMENT LIMITATION.  The plaintiffs were
divorced equal shareholders in a cotton ginning corporation.
The corporation provided financing to several cotton farming
operations which leased land from the shareholders.  One
operation was a partnership of one shareholder and the
shareholder's daughter.  One operation was a partnership
with one shareholder and two unrelated partners. One
operation was owned by a daughter of a shareholder, and one
operation was a partnership of unrelated persons.  The
ASCS had ruled that all of the persons and entities were one
person for purposes of the $50,000 payment limitation rule
because the ginning corporation provided financing and had
an indirect interest in the farming operations financed.  The
court held that because the financing of the partnership and
individual operations was not provided by the partners to the
extent of their individual interests in the operation, the
partners could not be considered separate persons.  However,
the corporation argued that it was eligible for the exception
of ASCS Handbook 5-CM as an "institution established to
provide commercial credit to individuals or entities."  The
ASCS argued that the exception was intended only for banks
or other lending institutions, but the court found no support
for this interpretation in the Handbook or regulations and
held that the ginning corporation qualified for the exception.
In making the original ruling, the ASCS had mitigated the
penalty to all of the operations except the mother-daughter
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partnership, because only one partner had signed the
financing agreements and the partnership had indicated on its
farm operating plan that it would obtain bank financing.
The court held that the exclusion of the partnership on these
grounds was arbitrary and capricious because the ASCS had
found that all parties had filled out their operating plans to
the best of their abilities. Golightly v. Yeutter, 7 8 0
F. Supp. 672 (D. Ariz. 1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  In an attempt to
provide support for a medically disabled relative without
endangering the relative's medicaid eligibility, the decedent's
will bequeathed property in trust to the relative's parent for
the care and support of persons with similar disabilities to
the relative's.  Other heirs challenged the will's trust
provision as establishing a passive trust and the executor
sought probate court reformation of the trust as a charitable
bequest.  The IRS ruled that the transfer to the trust was not
eligible for a charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9209008 ,
Nov. 27, 1991.
DISCLAIMERS.  The decedent and surviving spouse
had acquired real property in 1984 as tenants by the entirety.
After the decedent's death in 1989, the surviving spouse
executed a written disclaimer of the decedent's interest in the
property which passed to the spouse as survivor of the
tenancy.  The IRS distinguished this case from several joint
tenancy cases which held that a disclaimer of a survivor's
interest in a joint tenancy could be made within nine
months after the joint tenant's death because a joint tenant
could sever the joint tenancy unilaterally.  The IRS ruled
that in the case of a tenancy by the entireties under Arkansas
law, the tenancy could be severed only by consent of both
tenants; therefore, the surviving spouse's disclaimer had to
be made within nine months after creation of the tenancy in
order to be effective for federal estate tax purposes. Ltr.
Rul. 9208003, Oct. 28, 1991.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The IRS has
issued the list of average annual effective interest rates
charged on new loans by the Farm Credit Bank system to be
used in computing the value of real property for special use
valuation purposes:












 Rev. Rul. 91-12, I.R.B. 1991-9, 18.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  On the estate tax return,
the executor claimed a marital deduction for property passing
in trust to the surviving spouse but failed to make the QTIP
election.  The IRS allowed an extension to file an amended
Schedule M to make the election because the executor
demonstrated the requisite intent to make the election in the
original return. Ltr. Rul. 92009003, no date given.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has issued
new procedures for changing a taxpayer's accounting method
without obtaining consent from the IRS.  The requirements
differ for (1) requests made before an examination, (2)
requests made within 90 days after notice of an examination,
and (3) requests made as a result of an examination.  R e v .
Proc. 92-20, I.R.B. 1992-12, 6.
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. In determining
their altnerative minimum tax, the taxpayers added their tax
preferences to their negative taxable income.  The taxpayers
argued that because the tax on the resulting figure would
otherwise have been reduced by their general business
credits, the tax preference items could be reduced by the
amount of unused general business credits.  The court held
that the taxpayers could not reduce the tax preference items
by the amount of unused general business credits.  U.S. v .
Deckelbaum, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,127 (D. Md. 1992).
COOPERATIVES.  A non-exempt purchasing and
supply cooperative had income from the recurring but
temporary investment of excess funds.  The excess funds
resulted from required contributions by member/patrons
which were redeemed in later years.  In addition, the
cooperative terminated a deferred income plan, distributing
the members' contributions to the members but retaining
income from investment of the plan principal.   In ruling
that the investment income was not patronage sourced
income, the IRS disagreed with several cases which had held
that the income from the temporary investment of excess
funds was patronage sourced income.  The IRS stated that
such income was not patronage sourced income because the
income was not derived from or furthered the cooperative
function of the business.  Instead, the IRS saw such income
as only furthering the overall profitability of the business.
As to the income from the deferred compensation plan, the
IRS also ruled that the income was not patronage sourced
income because the investment did not further the
cooperative functions of the business. Ltr. R u l .
9208004, Oct. 31, 1991.
C CORPORATIONS
DISTRIBUTIONS OF STOCK.  The taxpayer
corporation was a general partner in a partnership and owned
the stock of another corporation.  The taxpayer's
responsibilities as a partner included management and
administration of rental properties owned by the partnership.
The taxpayer sought tax-free distribution of its stock in the
other corporation to its shareholders under I.R.C. § 355.
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer's involvement in the
management and administration of the partnership rental
properties was an active trade or business, making the stock
distribution eligible for Section 355 treatment.  Rev. Rul.
92-17, I.R.B. 1992-12, 16.
ESTIMATED TAXES.  The IRS has announced that
the new rules for determining estimated tax payments
instituted by the Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991
are effective beginning with the second quarterly estimated
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tax payments.  The new rules do not apply to farmers or
fishermen or to individual taxpayers with less than $75,000
in adjusted gross income and an increase of annual income
of more than $40,000.  The revised Publication 505, "Tax
Withholding and Estimated Tax," is available by calling, 1-
800-TAX FORM.  I.R. 92-18, Feb. 28, 1992.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION.  The taxpayer
owned forest land for the purpose of preserving the land in a
natural state for wild flora and fauna.  The forest suffered
damage from Hurricane Hugo and the taxpayer decided to
remove damaged trees and sell them.  The taxpayer sought
approval that the loss of the trees was an involuntary
conversion such that the gain realized from the sale of the
damaged trees would not be taxable because the proceeds
were used to purchase adjacent additional forest land.  The
IRS distinguished this case from Rev. Rul. 80-175, 1980-2
C.B. 230 where trees grown for lumber were damaged by a
hurricane and were forced to be sold as salvage with the
proceeds used to purchase other standing timber.  The IRS
ruled that in the instant case, the removal of the trees and
their sale were not required because the damage by the
hurricane did not render the land unusable for the purpose,
natural habitat, intended by the taxpayer.  The removal and
sale of the trees only enhanced the regeneration of the forest
which would have occurred in any case.  In addition, the
purchase of the adjacent land was not a replacement of the
damaged land but was an acquisition of additional land.
Therefore, the hurricane damage was not an involuntary
conversion.  Ltr. Rul. 9209006, Nov. 15, 1991.
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The IRS
mailed the FPAA notice to the partnership at its last known
address but did not indicate a Tax Matters Partner (TMP).
The IRS also mailed the FPAA to the TMP but did not refer
to the partner as the TMP.  The court ruled that the FPAA
notice was adequate.  Ophir Mine v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1992-119.
ADJUSTMENT OF BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP
PROPERTY.  A partnership with two equal partners owned
a capital asset and an interest in another partnership which
owned a capital asset and a noncapital asset.  Both
partnerships had valid Section 754 elections to adjust basis
in partnership property.  In the first situation, the upper-tier
partnership distributed one-half of its capital asset to one
partner.  In the second situation, the upper-tier partnership
distributed its interest in the lower-tier partnership to the
partner.  In the first situation, the IRS ruled that the upper-
tier partnership adjusts the basis of the undistributed portion
of the capital asset and interest in the other partnership in
proportion to the difference between the value and the basis
of each asset.  The lower tier partnership will adjust the
basis of its property only as to the interest of the upper-tier
partnership.  In the second situation, the IRS ruled that the
upper-tier partnership adjusts the basis of the capital asset
by the amount of the basis in the distributed property over
the basis of the distributed property in the hands of the
receiving partner.  The lower-tier partnership also adjusts the
basis of its property unless their fair market value exceeds
their basis.  In both cases, the distributions are not
considered a sale or exchange for purposes of terminating
either partnership. Rev. Rul. 92-15, I.R.B. 1992-
12, 12.
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS.  The IRS
has announced the 1992 inflation adjusted amounts of debt
instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount rate
limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
     or     Exchange                                                                                                                                                                          Amount                                         Amount        
1992 $3,234,900 $2,310,600
Rev. Rul. 92-6, I.R.B. 1991-4, 7.
RETIREMENT PLANS .  For plans beginning in
February 1992 the weighted average is 8.39 percent with the
permissible range of 7.55 to 9.23 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 92-8, I.R.B. 1992-9, 5.
RETURNS .  The IRS has issued an update of the
circumstances under which the disclosure on a taxpayer's
return of a position is adequate for purposes of reducing the
understatement of income tax under I.R.C. § 6662(d), and
tax preparer's penalty under I.R.C. § 6694(a).  The update
contains no substantive changes from prior revenue
procedures.  Rev. Proc. 92-23, I.R.B. 1992-13, 11.
S CORPORATIONS
RE-ELECTION.  An S corporation owned by three
shareholders voluntarily terminated the S corporation
election as of the same date all stock was sold to an
unrelated person.  The new owner sought re-election of the
S corporation status four years later.  The IRS ruled that the
re-election would be allowed. Ltr. Rul. 90209021 ,
Nov. 27, 1991.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  The IRS assessed a
deficiency against an S corporation shareholder attributable
to disallowance of a corporate loss.  The assessment was
made after three years after the S corporation return but
within three years of the shareholder's return.  The Tax
Court held that the statute of limitations was to be applied
at the shareholder level.  The decision conflicts with the
decision in Kelley v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1986-405, rev'd
89-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9360 (9th Cir. 1989).  Felhaber v .
Comm'r, 92-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 1 3 1
(11th Cir. 1992), aff'g , 94 T.C. 863 (1990).
TAXABLE INCOME.  The taxpayer farmer
purchased three $20,000 certificates of deposit in 1985 and
the IRS alleged that the money was income.  The court
found that the taxpayer received the money as a gift in 1927
from a grandparent who admonished the taxpayer to save the
money to care for the taxpayer's mother.  The taxpayer
claimed to have kept the money hidden until after the
mother died because the taxpayer distrusted banks and feared
theft.  The court held that the taxpayer's story was credible
and overcame the presumption that the bank deposits were
income.  Howard v. U.S., 779 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.
Ind. 1991).
MORTGAGES
FORECLOSURE.  The defendant was the son and
tenant of a farm land owner who consented to a foreclosure
judgment against the land.  The land was sold and the
plaintiff purchaser sought eviction of the defendant and the
defendant's property.  The defendant argued that the defendant
had an interest in the property resulting from the tenancy
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and improvements made to the property and that the
foreclosure judgment was not effective as to the defendant
because the defendant was not made a party to the
foreclosure action.  The court held that the defendant's
ownership interest in grain bins affixed to the foreclosed
property was terminated when the lease ended and the
defendant failed to file a written notice of intent to remove
the grain bins.  The court also held that the defendant failed
to demonstrate any interest in the land adverse to the title
holder because the use of the land was permitted by the lease
with the title holder.  Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul
v. Martinson, 478 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1991).
NEGLIGENCE
INVITEE.  The plaintiff was the owner of a grain truck
damaged when the truck slipped off a bridge constructed by
the defendant on the defendant's property.  The truck was
hauling grain for an adjacent landowner.  The plaintiff had
called the defendant to inquire whether the bridge would
support a large semi carrying grain and the defendant had
warned that the bridge would hold a semi but that the semi
had to stay in the center.  Although the trial court had found
the defendant partially at fault for the accident, the lower
appeals court had held that the defendant's warning satisfied
the defendant's duty toward an invitee.  The upper appeals
court held that a jury question remained as to whether the
warning given by the defendant was sufficient in that the
warning did not completely disclose the dangers of the
bridge.  The court also held improper a jury instruction
allowing use of government standards for public bridges as
evidence of custom generally followed in constructing
private bridges.  Simon's Feed Store, Inc. v .
Leslein, 478 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1991).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
ASSUMPTION OF RISK.  The plaintiffs brought
an action for negligence and breach of warranty against the
builder of a hog confinement building which collapsed after
a 28 inch snowfall. The plaintiffs had not used the building
for several months prior to the collapse and the normal
snow melt on the roof from the heat from the hogs did not
occur.  The plaintiffs objected to instructions on assumption
of risk and contributory negligence, arguing that the
evidence did not support either instruction.  The court held
that failure to remove a heavy accumulation of snow,
especially after a 28 inch snowfall, was sufficient evidence
that the plaintiffs assumed the risk of the roof collapsing
and were contributorily negligent in failing to remove the
snow.  Gerlach v. Ethan Coop. Lumber Ass'n,
478 N.W.2d 828 (S.D. 1991).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
IRRIGATION DITCH.  The parties were
neighboring landowners with appurtenant water rights to
water flowing in a ditch through the defendant's property on
to the plaintiff's land.  The plaintiff used the water by
blocking the ditch and flooding irrigating crop land.  After
the defendant purchased the land, the defendant removed dirt
from the ditch, causing the water flow to decrease such that
flood irrigation by the plaintiff was not possible.  The
plaintiff sought a permanent injunction and restoration of
the ditch.  The defendant complied with a temporary
injunction by replacing the removed dirt but the plaintiff
argued that the replacement dirt was more susceptible to
washout and sought to require the defendant to line the ditch
with bentonite or make other repairs to restore the ditch.
The court held that the repairs made were insufficient to
completely restore the ditch and ordered the defendant to
increase the banks of the ditch and line the banks with




FORECLOSURE SALE.  The plaintiff owned farm
land in two counties which was subject to a foreclosure and
sheriff's sale.  The land was sold as separate parcels in a
single sheriff's sale to the lien holder.  The plaintiff was
present at the sale and did not object to the sale of the land
not located in the county where the sheriff's sale occurred.
Over the following several years, the plaintiff filed
objections to the sheriff's sale in two bankruptcy
proceedings and two state court proceedings, claiming that
the sale of the property in another county violated N.D.
Cent. Code §§ 28-21-05 and 28-23-05.  All of the
objections were denied by the courts and the plaintiff
appealed only the last judgment.  In the meantime, the
plaintiff had been evicted and the property sold to third
parties.  The court held that the sale did violate the statutes
but that the violation made the sale only voidable.  The
court also held that the plaintiff had waited too long in
objecting to the sale through the appeal process.  Rott v .
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 478 N.W.2d
570 (N.D. 1991).
GENERIC COMMODITY CERTIFICATES.
The debtors granted a bank a security interest in all crops
grown or to be grown and all accounts receivable, contract
rights and general intangibles, including after acquired
property.  Prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtors assigned
part of their interests in government program payments and
received generic commodity certificates for the previous crop
year and the crop year of filing for bankruptcy.  The trustee
argued that the bank's security interest did not attach to the
commodity certificate because a federal regulation, 7 C.F.R.
§ 770.4(b)(2), prohibited attachment of liens and security
interests to the certificates.  The trustee argued that the
federal regulation pre-empted the state security interest law.
The court followed In re George, 119 B.R. 800 (D. Kan.
1990), see Vol 2, Agric.L.Dig., p. 7, and held that the CCC
had no authority under federal law to pre-empt state law in
this area; therefore, the bank's security interest attached to
the commodity certificates.  In re  Selzer, 135 B . R .







BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The plaintiffs' farm had
been sold at foreclosure to the mortgagee.  The property was
redeemed by a purchaser of a junior lienor's interest in the
property and the plaintiffs sued the purchaser and lien holder
for failure to offer to sell the farm to the plaintiffs first as
required by Minn. Stat. § 500.24.  The trial court found that
the plaintiffs and their wholly-owned corporation were
family farmers, but the appellate court remanded on this
issue for failure of the trial court to include a basis for this
ruling in the record.  The trial court had held that although
the plaintiffs were entitled to a right of first refusal, the
plaintiffs would not be allowed to purchase the farm at the
sale price because the purchaser had invested substantial
sums in the property.  The appellate court held that if the
plaintiffs were family farmers, they were entitled to specific
performance of their right of first refusal and the purchaser
only had a right to seek compensation for any investment.
Lilyerd v. Carlson, 478 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. C t .
App. 1991).
NEW PUBLICATION
Neil Hamilton, the Richard M. and Anita Calkins
Distinguished Professor of Law, and Director, Agricultural
Law Center at Drake University, has published A
Livestock Producer's Legal Guide to: Nuisance,
Land Use Control and Environmental Law.  The
book is written for farmers and ranchers but also contains
legal citations and a discussion of agricultural nuisance
statutory and case law of all 50 states.  The book may be
ordered for a check for $12.00 to Drake University from
Drake University Agricultural Law Center, Nuisance Law
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